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- FREE TRADE AREAS : AN APPRAISAL 
Summary imd CQnclusions 
Free .Trade  Areas  in  various  forms  an~ .guises  are  proliferating  world-wide.  The 
European  Union  has . concluded  and  is  currently  negotiating  a  number  of 
. preferentiall(ree ·~e  ag~ments. 
.  . 
This paper examines Ff  As in the light of 2 key factors :  '.· 
(a)  The new obligations and the reinforcement of existing obligations undertaken by 
tlte Union in the GA  TT/WTO have important implications for Ff  As.  ·An Ff  A 
I  •- - . 
.  must  c.;>Ver. substantially  all  trade.  The  exclusion  of a major  component  of 
bilateral trade. would  result  ~n the  agreement  bein~ in  contravention of WTO 
· rules.  The  . WTO's  substantive  obligations  are,  furtherm.ore,  reinforced  by 
strengthened ·  procedura.I  requireqtents.  The  possibility  of  panel· litigation 
·against  FI'As  wi~ require  all  WTO  members  to  respect  scrupulously· these· 
obligations. 
(b)  Economic gains arise out of :FT As from, in the shorter run, trade. cre~tion and in-
the longer term. dynamic effeds arising from a  ·larger market, greater potential 
inves~ent and improved competitiveness. Conveying ·a clear·political message 
to a country regarding its importaQce for the Union also ~mains  a motivation for 
proposmg an Ff  A~ The nature and magnitude of the benefitS will depend upon 
the individual Ff  A and  u~n  the  place of that agreement  in the. EU's  overall 
.  .  . 
extern~ relatiqris policy.  . 2 
Conclusions 
1.  The EU  has  consistently  favoured  open  regionalism.  The Union,  as  a  matter  of 
principle,. welcomes all Ff  As which respect WTO rules. 
2.  Possible. Ff  As, whether concluded by  the EU or by others, must be assessed in  the 
light of  their impact on EU interests and intemation~l obligations. 
3.  Decisions~ to  negotiate·. an  Ff  A  need  to  be  made  on  the  basis  of a case  by  case 
analysis of the mutual benefits for the EU and its partners.  This has  to be done  in 
full  awareness of the  new  WTO conditions  (coverage,  full  reciprocity,  transition 
arrangements,  the  possibility  of  referral  of  such  agreements  to  WTO  dispute 
settlement, etc.)  and of the  overall costs  and benefits.  These considerations  also 
apply to FfAs currently being negotiated. 
4.  Such an analysis should take into account not only direct costs and benefits but also 
wider strategic  considerations  of an  economic  and  political  nature.  It  remains 
important, for the conduct of the subsequent negotiation as well as for other internal 
Union policies, for a serious analysis to be made of the economic costs and benefits 
involved and of the implications for our relations with other partners.  They can then 
be weighed in the balance with the other relevant considerations. 
5  Where we envisage regional· or bilateral liberalisation, we should satisfy ourselves 
before proposing a  negotiation  that  an  ambitious Ff  A, covering the  full  range of 
obstacles to  trade  and  meeting  fully  our international  obligations,  is  a  politically 
realistic  objective.  Otherwise,  the  EU  risks  findipg  itself bogged  down  in  long-
drawn  and,  perhaps  ultimately  frQitless,  negotiations  with  third  countries,  with 
negative political consequences. 3 
· .I. Current state of play. 
· 1.  A Free  Trade  Area  is  created  when  B:_  group  of two  or  more_  customs  territories 
eliminate the duties and other broader restrictions on trade between .them in  product~ 
originating in those customs territories, in respect of "substantially ail the trade".  This  .  .  ~  .  -
definition, drawn from (fA  TT, is the. subject of widespread interpretative statements, 
some of them  finalised  as  recently  as  last year's  Marrakech agreement.  The  key 
element in an Ff  A is · tariff elimination.  A~ the definition makes clear, Ff  As  may 
.  . 
i~clude  tariff  elimination  and  other forms  of economic  deregulation.  Equally, 
. agreements  to  increase  trade  opportunities  'may  include  economic  co~operation 
measures but -not include tariff  elimination, and so not be Ff  As.  For the purposes of 
.  .  .  .  . 
this  paper,  Ff  As  are.  defined  as  all  agreements  which  include  tariff elimination 
provisions. 
.  .  ' 
·  2.  The European Union currently h~s concluded various types of  preferenti~.l agreements 
which incorporate a tariff elimination component.  These include agreements with the 
'  Baltics, the (residual) EEA, the CEECs, Israel, Switzerland, Cyprus, Malta, the Faroe 
Islands,  San  Marino  and  Andorra,  the_latter  two  being  Custom  Unions.  N<;>n 
reciprocal  agreements  exist  with·  the  Maghreb  and  Mashreq  countries  and  the 
signatories of the Lome convention.  (see Table HI in annex) .. 
3.  At  the  same. time,  the  Union  is· negotiating  new  agreements  with  Morocco  and 
Tunisia; while talks with the  Gulf Co-operation Council ·-on a Ff  A are. still  open. 
With regards to Turkey,  negotiations on the implementation of,the Custoll)S  Union 
ar~ currently. underway.  The· partnership  agreement  with  Russia  and  the  Ukraine  · 
provide for the possl~ility of a  Ff  A when the agreement is reviewed in 1998..  Similar: 
provisions are  likely to  be ·included in· some,  at  least,  of the  a~reements cu~ently 
being ne~oti~ted wit.h th_e NIS. 
4.  The  ·Council  has · before  it  Commission ·communications  .  concerning  bilateral 
.liberalisation·  in  the  Mediterranean,  with  MERCOSUR and  with  Mexico.·  The 
Commission must shortly propose to  the Council ict'eas  for  developing the bilateral 
·relationship with Sootb Africa. · 
5.  · ~he  Union is not alone in undertaking such initiatives.  Indeed,  the~e is a proliferation 
of such regional agreements, proposed or actual, across the world. ·For exampie, the  · 
.  '  ~  ' 
Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic  Relations Trade. Area  (ANZCERTA)  and 
the MERCOSUR Customs Union are  in operation, the  North  American Free Trade  · 
Area (NAFrA) is now a reality, whil_e ASEAN, the Group of Three. (see Table IV in 4 
annex for membership and coverage), have all set themselves the target of tariff-free 
trade,  with timetables of varying degrees of ambition.  Though there  are  important 
differences  in  the  interpretation  of the  initiative,  leaders  of the  APEC  member 
economies  agreed  in  Bogor  last  November  to  establish  "free  and  open  trade  and 
investment" in theAsia-Pacific area.  More recently, in December, leaders of 34 of the 
35 countries of the Western Hemisphere agreed in Miami  to  create the  Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FT  AA) for which  nego~ations should be concluded no  later 
than 2005.  Finally, the Canadian Prime Minister has suggested that the EU consider 
the idea of trans-Atlantic free trade, although USTR Kantor has reacted coolly to the 
idea. 
ii. FT  As in. the WTO 
1.  The  new  obligations  in  the  GATIIWTO have  important  implications for FTAs, 
'whether concluded by the Union or by others.  This requires increased vigilance by 
the Commission, not least to ensure that our trading partners respect WTO rules as 
we do. 
2.  To date, the free trade agreements concluded by  the  Union  have been  restricted in 
terms of product coverage.  In  particular, they have.  generally excluded all or most 
agricultural  trade.  The GAIT examination  of EU  agreements  in  terms  of both 
product coverage and other aspects of GAIT conformity,  notably  non-reciprocity, 
has not in practice constralned our room for manoeuvre. 
3.  The Uruguay  Round  Understanding on  the  Interpretation of Article  XXIV of the 
GATT clarifies further the  conditions  under which Ff  As  may  be concluded  and 
imposes  additional  obligations  on  WTO  members.  The  exclusion  of  a  major 
component of bilateral trade would result in the agreement being in contravention of 
WTO rulesl.  Furthermore, the  Understanding  specifies  that  the  transition  period 
envisaged  by  the  parties  to  such  an  agreement  should  excee~ ten  years  only  in 
exceptional circumstances.  In  addition  an  FT  A  once  fulJy  implemented  should 
result in reciprocal and symmetrical trade liberalisation.  FT  As must be notified for 
scrutiny without delay and periodic reports have to be given by the parties involved 
on  the  functioning  of  the  agreement.  Differences  between  WTO  members 
concerning an FT  A can be referred to WTO dispute settlement, so that in future the 
constraints  of WTO  will  apply  more  consistently  than  in  the  past.  A· detailed 
analysis of the new conditions is to be found in Annex 1 of this paper. 
I  This test is applied to trade in industrial, primary and agricultural goods as a whole. 5 
4.  Regarding· serviCes,  the  GATS  agreement  permits  the  c'onclusion  of preferential 
agreements on services, .subject to the· provisions of Article V.  This stipulates that 
. the  agreement should ·have substantial  sectoral ·coverage -and  should be  based on 
national treatment among the parties involved.  The former condition is  understood 
in terms· of the numbet of sectors, volume· of trade affected and modes Of supply.  In 
order to  meet this  condition agreements  should not exclude a priori  any  mode  of  .  .  .  . 
supply. (see Annex .2). 
5.  Itis clearly-in our interest that  FfAs respect fully  these obligations._  Others;  not 
least 'the United States, are  also pursuing their  <?Wn  regionalisation strategies with 
.  .  ~  .  . 
APEC, NABT A,  etc.  Any  move  which would undermine WTO rules on regional 
initiatives,  persis-tent  demands  for  derogations  on  transition  periods .  etc.  would 
weaken a set of  rules whose respect is in the long term interest ofthe Union. 
6.  The spread of Ff  As  also raises the important question of rules of origin.  Rules of 
. origin are an essential element of any Ff  A and without adequate workable rules it is 
· unlikely that an Ff  A can succeed. -One of the major problems the Union will face is 
developing rules which take into account its various trading relationships and which 
are acceptable to its partners.  It has already become apparent that the numerous sets · 
of origin rules resulting from the proliferation. of trade agreements ~ave made· the full . 
exploitation  of such  agreements  by  economic .  operators  questionable.  Careful 
consideration needs to be give'n  to. the existing approach towards rules of origin in 
order to ensur:e that the rules remain workable and that burdens such  a&  compliance 
costs are kept to an acceptable level. 
7.  The strategy towards unification of rules of origin in trade between the Community, 
the CEEC and the EFf  A countries, endorsed at Essen, shows that this difficult issue 
is already being tackled.  Following the Uruguay Round, multilateral discussions on 
common non-preferential  rules  have  begu~. but no  WTO  work· programme is  yet · 
envisaged for preferential rule~. "6 
III  Why FTAs? 
1.  FT  As are 'economically •beneficial, especially ·where  th~y  ;help the EU to 'bolster its 
presence ;in ··the  faster _growing  economies· of  ~the world, which js :our  overridiqg 
interest.  }Much  attention  has  been  focused  <on  whether  regional  free  trade 
arrangements  are  likely  to  result ..in  trade  creation  or .trade  diversion.  Ff  As  are 
usually ttrade  creating.  The  statistical  evidence  shows  that  the  growth  of inter-
regiona:I !.trade world-wide over the last decade has been about as  strong as  that of 
intra-regiomil  trade.  There  is  considerable  ~greement among  economists  that 
preferenfuil :trade agreements .between countries forming a "natural trade bloc", i.e. 
countries ·,with strong  rec~procal trade links. are less likely to have detrimental trade 
diversion :<.effects on .global trade, than similar arraqgements between countries which 
are not already close trading partners.  (see Annex '3?. 
2.  More recently, this  direct ·economic justification has  also been supplemented by · 
strategic considerations regarding  the  need  to :reinforce our presence  in  particular 
markets  and  to  attenuate  the  potential  threat  ,c)f  others  establishing  privileged 
relations with countries which are economically important to us. 
3.  Political considerations are  as important as the .potential-economic benefits and in 
some cases  may  be the  primary  motivation.  Ff  As  are  coming  to  be seen  as  an 
indicator of the strength of our relationship with a country or· region.  They promote 
the  principle  of  open  regionalism  and  can  generate  trade  liberatisation  that 
subsequently  spreads  to  the  multilateral  field.  It  is  also. important to  be  able  to 
deliver the  FT  A once it is  proposed.  It  would be counterproductive to  take Ff  A 
initiatives without being reasonably sure that the negotiations can succeed. 
.  ' 
4.  However,  the  greater the  number of Ff  As  which  are  concluded  the  smaller the 
economic preference effect.  This is why it is necessary to establish EU priorities in 
the light of an overall vision, although particular arrangements must be defined in a 
.selective way on  a case·by case basis. 
5.  Multilateral tariff negotiations have done much to reduce the levels of tariffs world 
wide.  Nevertheless, the level of tariffs in many of our partner countries, particularly 
the newly industrialised and· developing countries,. remains high.  Tariff averages of 
30-40% are ·not uncommon (EU trade weighted tariff average for all products -4.6%, 
UNCT  AD calculation).  It, therefore, can seem obviously in our interest to persuade 
such countries to  enter into Ff  As  with the  Union, enabling  us  to  encourage both 
tariff elimination and deregulation. 7 
6.  While  prohibitive  tariffs  may  be  the  determining  factor  in  EU  trade  in  certain 
specific  products  and  specific  countries,  international  trade  is  affected  by  other 
influences, many of which may in fact be more important than tariffs.  The Union's 
exports increasingly include services as well as industrial goods ana are, in any case, 
often hindered more by non-tariff barriers, whether intentionai .or not, than by tariff 
rates.  Regulatory  obsta~les, subsidies,  customs  procedures  etc.  can  be crucial  -in 
determining the ease with which we can trade with our partners.  Equally important, 
the  inves~ent policies  of the  latter  can  prevent .  EU firms. from  establishing  a  .· 
physical presence in third country markets through foreign direct investment thereby 
depriving the Union  of the· trade  gains· which .often  accompany  FDI.  The  more 
economic globalisation proceeds, the more such factors will gain in importance. 
7.  This analysis  also  makes clear that  FI'  As  should include  provision~ for  forms  of 
~  ' 
economic  co-operation,  in·  the  sphere  of  investment  regulation,  standards . and 
certification,  industry  dialogue,  administrative  practices  and  so  on,  if the  Union's 
relations  \Vith  third countries or regions  ~e to be reinforced in  the  most effective 
manner.  Failure on our part to engage in this type of wider economic co-operation · 
may well result in  important ec(}nomic  regions developing a·  regulatory. framework . 
.  . 
whi~h will potentially hurt the Union's interests.  The example of APEC illustrates 
· this  point  particularly  well.  If the :countries  of EaSt  Asia. were,  -as  a· result  of 
.  . .  .  . 
regulatory co-operation within APEC, to align  th~ir regulatory systems practices to 
.  .  .  .  . 
those ofthe United States, this would place the EU at a competitive disadv~tage, at 
least to the extent th~t a large and dynruiiic part of the world economy developed as, a 
. ~suit asystein which diverged significantly from that of the Union.  Tariff-free trade. 
'  . 
and trade facilitation are therefore two complementary tools of  exp?rt enhancement. 
IV. Third Country ~nitiatives 
.  1.  The  trend  towards  regional  co-operation  initiativ~s . js  intensifying  world-wide. 
.  .  .  .  •  l·  .  . 
Many,  if not all  such initiatives  include. tariff liberalisation,  and .1,1ltimately  tariff 
elimination,  between the actual ot emerging groupings. · Most go beyond this and 
envisage -the  setting  up  of customs  unions  and/or  regulatory  and  economic  co-
operation.  The Union supports such initiatives, provided they  are  in  accord. with · 
. GATT/WTO  rules  and  hence  do  n~t undemiine .  the  working .of ihe  multilateral 
system~ While these initiatives generally. seem to CQJ:!lply with multil!lt~ral rules, not 
'  ' 
all have  submitted them to GATI.  Some contain provisions. or have set themselves 
objectives  which  cause  concern  in  the  Union  (e.g:  NAFI'A:  origin  rules;  APEC: 
potentia}  harmonisation of telecom and other industrial standards, .investment rules 8 
etc.)  .. 
2.  Enhancing. the Union's relations· with third countries and regional sub-groups is  one 
way  of ensuring  that  EU  approaches  to  trade  liberalisation  are  consistent  with 
developmenrs,on.key export markets. The EU has an interest in helping to consolidate 
independent initiatives such as  MERCOSUR.  Reinforcing links with ASEAN, for 
example; or· with individual countries of the Asian region, would also help to ensure 
that Asian; regional integration occurs in a way compatible to EU interests.  The EU 
also has an· interest in supporting deeper integration .in southern Africa, with the full 
involvement of South Africa. 
3.  There· may  however be  cases  where our trading  partners do  not at  present favour 
Ff  As.  The apparent reluctance of many of the East Asian countries to establish free 
trade even within the region, witness the  vacillation over the ASEAN Ff  A,  as  well 
as the cool reception. given to the Eminent Persons Group proposals for a target date 
in the APEC setting, suggests that the alternative forms of economic and regulatory 
(and  political)  co-operation  being  discussed  with  ASEAN,  are  likely  to  be  more 
fruitful.  It would  also  be more  effective  in countering  possible  adverse  regional 
developments in the regulatory area. 
4.  The Copenhagen European Council of June 1993agreed that the associated countries 
of Central  and  Eastern  Europe  (the  countries  with  whom  the  EU  has· concluded 
Europe Agreements) can accede to  the  European Union as  soon  as  they  meet the 
conditions of  membership~ The Europe Agreements will lead to eventual free trade in 
industrial  products  between  the  EU  and  the  CEECs.  Most  industrial  products 
exported. by  the  CEECs enter duty-free,  and  all  remaining  EU  protection  against 
sensitive sectors will be removed within two years 
5.  The more Ff  As the  Union -:oncludes in the next few  yeats, the more rapidly the 
CEEC  economies  will  have  to  adjust  their  ~onomies if they  are  to  meet  the 
challenge..  In the  longer  term,_  it  is  not  clear to  what  extent  the  relative  tariff · 
preferences enjoyed by  the  associated countries  are  important,  compared to  other 
factors  such  as  the  underlying  competitiveness  of industry.  The  situation  with 
respect to agricultural products is more difficult. 9 
V.  Future Options 
1.  The ·key question  is  whether,_  on both  the  economic  and  the . political  fronts  the 
benefits for the  Uni~~ of duty-free .access to deregulated third country markets are 
greater than the adjustment costs of the EU concessions needed to produ9e a WTO-
compatible Ff  ~· 
The Multilate.ral Option 
2·.- · Iris in ·any case in EU interests· to pursue sustained multilateralliberalisation  On the · 
·  ~ade  front  the  implement~ti"on  of  multilateral  liberalisation  is  simple  (no 
· requirements for speCial origin rules) and flexible (no ·WTO limit on tariff transition 
periods)  However, further generalised multilateral tariff elimination caqnot be for 
immediate action, but would be a  subject for discussion only when it is clear that the 
UR outcome is being implemented in a satisfactory manner.  This will take time  . 
. The FTA option · 
) 
3.  Alqngside  the  multilateral  option,  we  should  keep  the biiateral option,  which,  as 
.  described in detail in  t~is pape~, can contribute over time to the multilateral process, 
·  I  as well as securing immediate gains for EU exporters.  The.above_analysjs sets out . 
.  the considerations which should be the basis for our judgeme~t in each case of the 
interest of  the EU ~d  our partners for bilateral tariff elimination agreements.  this 
judgement must give full weight to the non-tariff as well as the tariff benefits. 
()ther options 
4-
( 
Where detailed analysis suggests that tariff eliffiination in conformity with our WTO 
.  .  .  . 
·obligations is not feasible between the EU an~ a third country, this does not ·mean 
that  n~ form  of bilateral  econom.lc  rapprochement  is possible.  .As :this  paper 
·tmderlines, there :are other useful bilatenil steps that can be taken to ease economic· 
're~ulations, with  the result of increased trade.  It may be  possible to constru~t useful 
bilateral economic packages without tariff elimination,  ~d.  without  ~reaching the 
WTO's non-discrimination requirements.  Such policies can help pave the way  to 
. further  biiateral  and  multilateral  liberalisation,  as .  well  as  being  complements to 
·'liberalisation, in an FfA  proper.~ 10 
Annex.l 
IMPLICATIONS OF ARTICLE XXIV. 
This note deals; with the obligations. relating to trade ih· goods (GATF rules will apply to 
trade in services; but are no less strict, the  reverse in  fact).  The distinction between. free 
trade  area  (FTJ\:)t, and  customs  union  will  not  be  diaw.n  at  every  opportunity  but  the 
working party sfieuld bear the  differences between the- two  types  of agreement in mind, 
especially  as  reg~ds  methods  for  fixing  the  duties  applicable  to  third.  countries 
(Art.  XXIV:5(c)).~.  Our  purpose  here  is  not  to  review  existing  agreements  or  the 
Commission's  draft proposals  or  services· under  the  GATT/WTO  rules,  but  simply  to 
identify the criteria for assessing the compatibility of Ff  As with the multilateral system. 
No objections 
The existence of regional free trade agreements is compatible with the multilateral system 
in theory and results in practice in the obligation on FrAs to comply with the procedures 
and substance of the GATT/WTO. If  a free trade agreement or customs union is found to 
conform to GATT/WTO rules and obligations, no criticism can be made against such an 
agreement on account of any supposed intention contrary to the spirit of the GATT/WTO 
(cf. the "hubs and spokes" model, however). 
-
This is  not only the current position of the EC,  and has been for decades, but it is  also 
actively supported by practically every country and GAIT.  itself (Sutherland speech). More 
significantly, this interpretation of the  role  of Ff  As  is  now enshrined in the  text of the 
'Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV' (second recital), which recognises 
that  "the  contribution  to  the  expansion  of world .  trade  that  may  be  made  by  closer 
integration between the economies of the parties to such agreements;,. 
Provided they conform to GATT/WTOrules 
The  obligation  to  conform  to  GATT/WTO  rules  cannot  be  underestimated.  True,  the 
review of free trade agreements and customs unions thus far has not resulted on the whole 
in  actual  constrliints on the countries that implemented them.  Nevertheless,  despite  this 
degree  of flexibility,  the  EEC  tias  suffered  under  the  system  on  account  of the  Lome 
Convention which does not include reciprocal preferences. Following the conclusions of 
the  panel on bananas, the  Community asked  for,  and  was  given  at  the  end  of 1994,  a 
derogation (Art. XXV:5) from the MFN clause granting preferential treatment to the ACP 
products included in Lome IV. In future, under the WTO, the relative tolerance shown by 
the Contracting Parties until now is likely to be considerably diminished. 
This  change  of attitude  is  reflected  in  the  'Understanding  on  the  Interpretation  of 
Art. XXIV' which deliberately spelt out the criteria which had been unspecified in the text 
of GATT and at the same time introduced additional obligations. 11 
The niles or scope for action in  ~he WTO 
1.  According to Article XXIV:8(b) a Free .Trade_ Zone (FT  A} is defined as·"group of two 
or more customs territories in  which the duties anq other. restrictive regulations  of 
commerce ( ... ) are eliminated on substantially _all  the trade between the constituent 
territories in products originating in such territories".  It has always been controversial 
what  constitutes  ''substantially  all  the  trade".  Within  GATT  Working  Parties ·on 
FT  A's various quantitative thresholds have been mentioned ranging from 80% to 90% 
. of trade between the partners, but the qualitative aspect of the notion has also been 
stressed;  the  exclusion  of whole  sectors,  such .as  agriculture,  has  been  deplored~ 
Working.parties have never been able, however, to reach clear conclusions on these 
questions.  The· Understanding on the Interpretation .-of. Article. XXIV sheds· a little 
additional light on the  question,  even  if it does  not cover paragraph  8  of Article 
XXIV.  In  a  preambular paragraph  it  states  that: the  contribution of  }TA's to  the  , 
expansion of world trade· will be "increased if the elimination between the constituent 
territories of duties and other restrictive.regulationsof conuri.erce extends to-all trade, 
and diminished if any major sector of trade is excluded".  At bes_t one could say that it 
m~y  be taken into account when the multilateral assessme.nt of an FT  A under article 
XXIV:5 (which·is interpreted in the Understanding)js made, but it does not go much 
.  beyond the statements on qualitative aspects of trade .coverage which have been made 
. in Working Parties at earlier occasions" · 
2. ·  Notification Of the'decision to enter into a free trade agreement, custom's  union or 
· interim agreement concluded with a view to e'stablishing either of the former must be 
"without  delay".  The  agreement  or  "plan  and  schedule · included  in  an  interim 
agreement"  will  be examined' by  a'GATIIWTO working  party which  may  make· 
"recommendations". Where a plan and schedule are not inCluded,  the  GATT/WtO 
can ask the parties to provide one. Finally, "the parties shall not maintain or put into 
force,  as  the case may be, -such agreement if they  are not prepared to modify it in 
accordance with these recommendations" (Art. XXIV:7(b)) ..  "Provision shall be made 
for subsequent review of the implementation of  .the-recommendations" (paragraph 10 
of the Understanding). In other words, revi~ws will be inore specific and less formal. 
'  . 
3.  The  "reasonable  length  of time"  allowed  for  an  interim  agreement  to  establish  a 
. customs un.ion or FT  A is given as ten years except in "exceptional cases" for which a 
. "full explanation"  must be  provided to the  Council of Trade. We already .have  an 
example of this in relation to our possible future agreements with Morocco, Tunisia 
· . and Egypt (?). The EC must give c~eful thought to  use of the "exception" argument 
which must only be allowed where clear justification exists. ·  ·  · 
1
4; ·  A  further  obligation  is  imposed on customs .union  and  FT  As  whiCh  "shall  report 
periodically  ....  on  the  operation  of  the  relevant  agreement"- (Understanding, 
paragraph  11;  i.e.  biennial  reporting).  Mr Sutherland  also  envisaged  a  "periodic 
collective-monitoring exercise"  which  "would have  the  advantage of revealing  the 
simultaneous status of mosrcontracting parties as both third parties and members_ of' 
agreements,  shoring  up  the  collective  interest  in  sustaining  the  credibility  of the 
multilateral rules" (speech given in Sao Paulo, July 1994).  .  . 
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5.  Trade liberalisation  must be  reciprocal  and  symmetrical.  The end  result· must  be 
achieved by  both partners  although  the  programme  may  allow  longer transitional 
periods to take account of different levels of development. 
6.  "Any matters arising from the application of Art. XXIV" may be invoked to initiate 
· dispute settlement proceedings (Understanding, paragraph 12). The dispute settlement 
system has been strengthened and made automatic,  in particular the  adoption of a 
panel  report  can  no  longer  be  blocked  by  a  veto.  This  provision  backs  up  the 
instruments described in the preceding points by giving them real teeth. 
Should services be covered? 
Should an FfA also cover trade  in services? The question does  not  arise  in the  WTO 
Agreement, therefore it follows  that there is  no  written obligation to  that effect.  A free 
trade agreement covering goods or services alone should be formally acceptable. However, 
recent history provides no cases of agreements which do not include services in part at 
least (ANCZERTA, US/CAN, NAFfA, MERCOSUR?, ASEAN, Europe Agreements, co-
operation agreementswith Russia/Ukraine, etc.) as well as  other sectors (investment, etc.) 
This tallies with the changing basic concept of what constitutes trade today. 
In addition to the  arguments. advanced  in  the  reference document and in meetings,  the 
following  point should be borne  in  mind.  The conviction that Ff  As  are  the  "building 
blocks" (rather than the "stumbling blocks") of the multilateral system is based not only on 
the tariff argument (if tariff concessions have been negotiated at bilateral or regional level; . 
it will not be so difficult to achieve the same level multinationally) but also (perhaps more 
so) on negotiations in other sectors (standards, public procurement, services). It could be 
argued that any agreement today amounting merely to an exchange of tariff concessions 
(even covering all sectors of trade in goods) could not fully constitute a "building block" of 
the multilateral system.  - · 
The Community's interest 
- a robust and effective monitoring system, because our trading partners have discovered 
the  advantages of regional  agreements and  most of the  new Ff  As  will  not include  the  · 
Community amongst their ranks. For the self-same reason, ·we should be in a position to 
undertake a far-reaching·review of our own free .trade agreements and customs unions. .) __ _ 
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ANNEX2 
FREE TRADE AREAS AND SERVICES 
· Should a Ff  A: also .cover services? 
.There is no requirement in the WTO that a free trade area In goods should also cover trade 
,  in .services.  The  inclusion  of services  would  reinforce  the  economic  effect  of the 
agreement;  however, this has to be done in full conf~rmity with the rule~ of the GATS. 
The 'GATS· agreement. envisages that the parties may  ~oJ}clude preferential. agreement on 
services, but only where the  conditions laid down in Article v are  met,  that is  that the 
_ agreement: 
(a)  has substantial sectoral coverage2, and  . 
(b)  provides  for  the  absence  or elimination. of substantially  all ·discrimination,  in  the 
. sense of artiCle  XVIP, between or among  the  Parties,  in  ~he sectors covered under 
subparagraph (a), through: 
(i)  "elimination of  existing discriminatory measures, and/or 
(ii)  prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures, 
.  either at the ·entry into force of that agreement or on the basis of 3:  reasonable time 
frame".  .  ,  . 
The additional conditions under the GATS a5 compared to those of tbtrGATT will render 
the  conclusion·  of a  preferential  agreement  coveri"ng  goods  .and  services  difficult.  In 
. particular, when the economies of the contracting Parties are  at  too  differen~ a level of 
development, the  exerci~e requires a real  effort by  the· parties.  Equally, eliminating all 
restrictions to  inve~tment from  the  Community is often a  sensitive issue  for  developing 
countries.- Preferential  agreements  in  services  should  be  avoided;.  unless  economic 
. advantages for both sides· are sufficiently strong to overcome these  difficulties~ and 'unless-
·probl~ms  ofp~dential regulation can be dealt with;  ..  . 
· With  the  e'\-ception  of· the  EEA,  the  only  preferential  agreements  concluded  by  the 
Community covering both goods and services are the Europe agreements.  Howeyer, the 
. specjfidty of 1he central.and eastern European countries, both in terms of geography and 
history·,  should  preclude  the  use  of .  the  Europe  agreements·  as ·  a  model  for  future 
relationships with other partners,/ This is most likely true asfar as concessions in terms of 
movement qf persons are concerned.  . 
2  This condition is understood in terms of number of sectors, volume of trade affected and modes of supply.  In order 
to meet this condition, agreements should not provide for the iJll].wi exclusion of any mode of supply. 
The modes of supply of a service are the supply:' 
(a)  from the territory of  one Member into the territory of  any other Member (cross-border);. 
·(b) in the territory  .. of one Member to the service consumer of any other Member (consumption abroad); 
.  (c) .by  a  service  supplier  of one  Mem.,er,  through  commercial  presence  in  the  territory  of any  other Member 
·  (commercial presence);  ) 
(d) by  a  service  supplier of one  Member,  through  commercial  presence of nat11ral  persons of a  ~ember in  the. 
L  - territory of any other Member (movement of  natural persons). 
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This was  confirmed by  the  negotiations  for  association  agreements  with Mediterranean 
countries conducted during 1994.  These negotiations clearly show that a political decision 
to  conclude  a free  trade  area  may  not  be  followed  by  the  necessary  concessions  for  a 
preferential agreement in. services. 
In  any case, according to  European service industries, the  approximation of laws  and the 
recognition  of qualifications,  standards  and  licensing procedures  would be more  useful 
than a preferential agreement.  , .1s· 
··ANNEX~ 
.  THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TARl!FF LIBERALISATION 
1.  -The economic costs and benefits of a FI'A for the participants· (imd the remaining 
·countries outside the· Ff  A) depend very much on the individual circumstances. of 
· the trade partners.  An assessment of the net impact (short and long term) therefore · 
requires a rather  d~tailed arid  dynamic economic anaiysis of the  sectoral/product 
structure  of trade  and  production  of the. partners  involved;  in  the  light  of the 
specific sectors which are covered in the Ff  A agreement.  · 
- -
2.  EU trade is reasonably well diversified in geographic tyrms (see Fig. I in annex ). 
About  a quarter of total  EU(15)  exports  are  destined  for  NAFf  A;  one  fifth  is 
direc~ed towards the Asian Pacific  (in~luding Japan); one tenth goes to Russia and 
the  NIS  plus the  CEECs; a further  tenth to  the ·Mediterranean Basin,  and 4%  to 
Latin America.  The picture for EU(15) imports is essentially the same.  Trade with 
· the CEECs and ASEAN has been growing particularly rapidly in recent years, as . 
has trade with NAFf  A and MERCOSUR, albeit at a lower rate.  On the grounds of · 
geographic distribution of trade, there is no  overwhelming argument in favour of _ 
conclud,ing an FTAwith one or another partner. 
3.  . Th_e  EU  does,  however,  have  an  overriding  economic  interest  in  increasing  its 
-· trade, -and  its  -economic -presence  in· general,  _in  the  fast  growi~g  newly 
industrialised or industrialising economies while, at the·sanie time, maintaining its 
position  in  the  mature  industrialised  countries.  An  important  yardstick  for 
_assessing a proposed FTA is the extent to which it contributes to the achievement 
-. of this objective.  The expected trade creation effects of an  FrA are particularly 
_  important in  this  respect,  more  so. than  the  trarl:e  diversion  effects,  although  the 
.  · latter are not with9ut value if they result in a declining relianc~ on stagnant or slow-
··growirtg markets.  In general, one might expect that in  view of its relatively low 
tariff rates,  the  EU _stands  a  good_ chance  of achieving ·an  improvement  in  its 
balance of trade with the Ff  A partner, particularly  if the  latter l;las  significantly 
higher tariffs on products which are of interest to EU exporters.  As  a general rule 
trade creation is mpst likely to occur when the_ partners in an Ff  A are major trading 
partners with similar trade/economic structures.  .  . 
4.  The longer-term dynamic effects of trade liberalising measures are, however, more 
important  than  the  short  term  trade  effects.  To  the  extent  that  Ff  As  create 
-additional trade flows, they will promote world ·economic growth, with generalised 
benefits both fot the FT A partners and others.  Further benefits can arise from the 
strategic use of Fr  As; intended to secure market share in a globalising economy. 
·  5~ - Various techniques and models exist for forecasting the likety  ou~come of an FT  A, 
gravity  models  and  general  computable  equilibrium  models  being _particularly 
favoured  in  recent  years.  Opinions  may  differ  over  whether  these  give  better 
-results than a more  qualitative assessment based on_ a careful examination of the· 
specifics  associated ·with  a  particular. FT A  proposal,  in  any  event  it  is  always 
reassuring if the  results of both qualitative and  qu~titative analysis -coincide.  _ 
.•  ' ·! 
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6.  The argument that the EU, with its relatively low tariff rates stands to gain directly 
from  an  Ff  A with countries or regions  with relatively  higher  tariff rates  applies 
principally  to  industrial  products.  The  question  is  much  more  problematic  for 
agricultural  products,  where,  even  after  the  reductions  agreed  in  the  Uruguay 
Round,  the  Union  will  maintain  high  levels  of  protection.  For  example, 
tariffication of our existing system with respect to  agricultural  products will,  it  is 
estimated,  result  in  tariff rates  of around  100%  on  beef,  more  than  100%  on 
pigmeat and poultry and  between 50 and 100% on cereals. 
7.  In the  future, Ff  As  are likely to have major implications  for  the  CAP:· Are  the 
economic benefits for the  Union of reduced tariffs  in  a given third market greater 
than the cost of tariff reductions in our own agricultural sector that are needed to 
meet WTO rules?  Even if we can meet Jhe WTO minimum, will third countries, 
particularly those for whom agricultural trade is important, agree to other types of 
ecqnomic  co-operation  without  the  prospect  of  substantive  agricultural  tariff 
liberalisation ?  These questions would have to be analysed case by case, bearing in 
mind that an Ff  A must cover substantially all  trade,  The exclusion of a  major 
component of bilateral trade would result in the agreement being in contravention 
ofWTO rules. 
8.  As  figure  II  demonstrates,  agricultural  trade  as  a  whole  frequently  represents  a 
substantial  component  of  overall  flows  between  the  EU  and  many  partner · 
countries.  A  far more detailed analysis of product coverage by country or region. 
concerned, as well as a detailed assessment of the dynamic impact of the Uruguay 
Round outcome on agricultural trade flows in general needs to be carried out before· 
the potential effects on EU imports of free trade can be estimated with any degree 
of confidence. 
9.  Accordingly, due attention should be given to the actual and potential structure of 
trade with any prospective free trade partners.  Unless the type of exports are such 
as  to  pose  few  additional  burdens  on  the  Union,  then  it  would  be  difficult  to' 
envisage an early implementation of a free trade agreement.  Indeed, this is likely to 
be  an  important  criterion  for  setting  priorities  in  the  negotiation  of  WTO-
compatible free trade areas. 
10.  Given the large and growing importance of services in total_ EU output and trade; the· 
sector should also be studied when ·considering bilateral economic initiatives.  (This 
is  yet  another  reason  why  investment  regimes  in  third  countries  are  of critical 
importance  for  the  overall  trade  prospects  of the  EU.)  Nevertheless, the GATS 
conditions  for  preferential  agreements  on  services,  notably  the  requirement  that 
markets have to be more open to natural persons in order to permit trade in services 
by  all  modes  of delivery,  represent  a  problem  for  the  Union.  This  is  amply 
illustrated by the negotiations with the Mediterranean countries, where it is  proving 
very difficult to deliver the necessary concessions to periPit the inclusion of services. ....... 
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Page: 
IIALANCF-'> 
1983  1984·  1991 
o,o 
-26'.4 
·1.1 
25.3. 
0.1 
-10.6 
. 3.7 
5.:1 
-1.0 
1.2 
l.l 
-7.5 
9.2 
0.8 
1.0 
-7.9 
27.9 
0.5 
?8  7 
OJ 
! 2.9 
J.5 
•  b.1 
u 
0.9 
1.9 
9.4 
16. 
1.2 
1.2 
-6.6 
0.0 
-24.1! 
14.4 
-11.0 
0.6 
115 
q,· 
3.5 
-1  I· 
0.7 
-3.4 
. 7.4 
3.5 
-1.2 
2.3 
·2.9 
19!!2 
11.0 
22.1 
l '-" 
10.5 
0.4 
IO'l 
-4  I 
1"_9 
0.7 
I .2 
1.1· 
7.2 
u 
%GROWTH (II 
IMPORTS  EXPORn; 
14  . 
\J 
(4) Intra/Total 
4X 
111 
1  ~4 
.:j 
I'> 
. ,.  7' 
14 
·u Table Ill:' Free Trade Agreements of the EU with Third Countries {not 
including-the EEA countries) 
Europe Agreements 
Title of Agreement  Period of Validity  Iype of Agreement 
Europe (association)  Signed on  16  Association agreement and 
HUNGARY  Agreement between the  December 1991  a fore runner to possible 
EC and their MS and the  Entered into force on I  accession providing for a 
Republic of Hungary  February 1994.  time-table and a phased  . 
approach 
Europe (association)  Signed on 16  Association agreement and 
POLAND  Agreement between the  December 1991  a fore runner to possible 
EC and their MS and the  Entered into force on 1  accession providing for a 
Republic of Poland  February 1994.  time-table and a phased 
approach 
Europe (association)  Signed on 4 October  Association agreement and 
CZECH  Agreement between the  19?3 (held up by the  a fore runner to possible 
REPUBLIC 
EC and their MS and the  splitting of  accession providing for a 
Czech Republic  Czechoslovakia).  time-table and a phased 
Entered into Force I  approach 
February 1995. 
Europe (association)  Signed on 4 October  Association agreement and 
SLOVAK  Agreement between the  1993 (held up by the  a fore runner to possible 
REPUBLIC  EC and their MS and the  splitting Qf  accession providing for a 
Slovak Republic  Czechoslovakia).  time-table and a phased 
Entered into force I  approach 
February 1995. 
Europe (association)  Signed on 8 March  Association agreement and 
BULGARIA.  Agreement between the  1993.  Entered into  a fore runner to possible 
EC and their MS and the  force I February 1995.  accession providing for a 
Republic of Bulgaria  time-table and a phased 
approach 
Europe (association)  Signed on I February  Association agreement and 
ROMANIA  Agreement between the  1993.  Entered into  a fore runner to possible 
EC and their MS and the  force I February 1995.  accession providing for a 
Republic of Romania  time-table and a phased 
approach 
Customs Union~ 
Title of Agreement  Period of Validity  Type of Agreement 
ANDORRA  Agreement between the  Entered into force the I  Provides for the 
EEC and the Principality  January 1991  for an  establishment of a customs 
of Andorra  unlimited period  union 
CYPRUS  Protocol laying down the  Signed on  19 October  Provides for the 
conditions and procedures  . 1981.  Entered into  establishment of a customs 
for the implementation of  force on I January  union in two phases. 
the 2nd stage of the  1988 for an unlimited 
Agreement establishing  period. 
the Association between 
the EC and the Republic 
of Cyprus 
1l MALTA 
TURKEY 
FTAs 
ISRAEL 
SWITZERLAND 
Title ofAgn~ement 
Agreement establ is hi ng · 
an Associatio·n between 
the European Economic 
Community and· Malta. 
. Agreement establishing 
an Association between. 
the European Economic 
Community and-Turkey 
2 
Period of  Validity  ·Type of Agreement 
.  Signed on December.  Provides for two stages The 
1970. Entered into  ,  first stage hai been 
force on l April 1971  ·  extended for an unlimited 
for an unlimited period.  period through a protocol  ---.. 
Signed on  12  -
September  196~.- Iri 
force from I December 
for an unlimited period. 
to the Agreement. 
Establishes a customs  . 
union and in principle 
paves the way to accession,_ 
comprising three stages. 
Title-of Agreement  ·,Period of Validity  Type of Agreement 
Agreement between the 
EEC and the State of 
Israel 
Agreement between the 
ECC and the Swiss  · 
Confederation 
Signed on 11  May 
1975.  Entered into 
. force m1  l July for an 
unlimited period 
Signed on 22 July 
1972.  In force for an 
unlimited period. 
Free trade and· . · 
cooperation agreement 
Preferential agreement 
creating a free-trade area 
Free trade agreements were signed with the·three Baltic states (ESTONIA, LATVIA and 
LITHUANIA) on 18 July 1994 and entered into force on 1 January 1995. 
.  '  .  - .  .  -
·Agreements including a t;lause considering afuture'FtA 
. RUSSIA 
Title of Agreement 
Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement 
Period of V  aiidity 
SigRed on 2816/94. 
Vatid 10 years with tacit 
reconduction  .. 
Type of Agreement 
A non-preferential 
agreement covering inter 
alia trade in goods, 
establishment and 
operation of  companies, 
trade in services, current 
payments IWi capital  . 
.  movemelltS. 
_The agreement mentions 
the objective of the 
creatiOO of a free ll'ade 
· area as well as cOnditions 
bringing about freedom of · 
establishment of 
comp&Rtes, cross border-
.  trade in services attd of 
•  •  'I 
capital movement. 
The parties will examine 
in  1998 whether the 
circuinstarices allow for 
the beginning of 
negoti_ations. UKRAINE 
BELARUS 
MOLDOVA 
ASEAN 
GULF 
COOPERATION 
COUNCIL 
Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement 
Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement 
Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement 
Cooperation Agreement 
between the EEC and 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand - member 
countries of ASEAN 
Cooperation Agreement 
between the EEC and the 
countries parties to the 
Charter of the Cooperation 
Council for the Arab States 
of the Gulf 
( 1)  Negotiations not yet complete 
Signed on 14/6/94. 
Valid 10 years with tacit 
reconductio11 
(1) 
'Initiated 26!7/94. 
Signature expected 
shortly. Same 
conditions. 
Signed on 7 March 
1980.  In force for five 
years.  Renewable 
thereafter for two-year 
periods.  Still in force 
pending the outcome of 
the current negotiations, 
interrupted 'sine die'. 
Signed on 15 June 
1986, for an unlimited 
period.  Entered into 
force on 1 January 
1990. 
3 
Framework agreement for 
commercial, economic 
and· development' 
cooperation. 
Under the heading of 
commercial cooperation; 
the parties undertake 
(among other items) 1Q 
study weys and means of 
eliminatim: trade barriers. 
Agreement providing for 
cooperation in an number 
of fields (economy, 
agriculture; fisheries, 
industry, etc.). 
Djalo~ue bas been 
resumed on a much 
broader basis. examinin& 
the possibility of 
developing a free-trade 
trade a&reemept. 
Sources: Annotated Summary of  Agreements Linking the Communities with Non-member 
Countries (as at 31 December 1993- Updated list June 1994)  Treaties Office. 
Commission of the European Communities. 
Data provided by 00  I services. Table IV:  ExamQies_ of FIA_membership and !heir coverage 
SECTORS  I 
FREE  TRADE 
AREAS 
NAFTA (.1) 
MERCOSUR (2) 
ANDEAN PACT (3) 
MEMBERS 
Canada. Mexico. US 
ArgentinO.  Brazil. 
Paraguay. Uruguay 
Bot1v1o.  Cotomb•a 
Ecuador.· 
Veriezueta. Peru 
Costa  ·Rico.  Et  Salvador. 
CENTRAL AM'ERICAN  'Guatemala. Honduras. 
COMMON MARKET  Nicaragua 
'G3 
./ 
- ANZCERTA 
V~nezuela Colornbra. 
MexicO 
Austrol•a. New ·zealorrd 
Bohre1n.  Kuwart.  Oman. 
GULF COOPERATION !Qatar. Saud• Aiao.a. 
COUNCIL.  ·  Uniled Arab.Emuates 
ASEAN/AFTA 
Brunei. lndonesra 
Motovs•o. Pnri•PD•nc s 
Srngopore.  ln_a.lano 
DATE  OF 
CREATION 
1992 
1991 
1969 
1960 
1994 
1983 
1981  ' 
1967/1993 
GOODS 
Agriculture  Automobile  Energy  Textiles 
Provisions ore includecJ on rules of origin. notional treatment. 
general market ciccess conditions c;md safeguards a~d  speci~l 
provisions addressed in lt1eSe  four sectors 
tnctuded  Included 
·Yes.  though  ·still  No. political 
many sensit1ve and  !Peru diHers 
protected products.  from the others. 
Yes.  although 
there 15  a list of 
goods ·subtect to 
a Spec1al Regime 
Not 1ncluded 
A step by step 
tnctud~d  Included 
No. 
not foreseen. !-included (4). 
Included 1n 
Not.•ncluded I  the •ndust11ot 
sector 
Yes.  with some 
_temporary 
e_xceptions 
.implementation  INot specif1ed I  Venezuela 
tnclude,d 
InCluded 
in ten yeors.is 
envisaged. 
Included· 
Included 
The agriculture sector! Motor vehicles ore 
w1ll be groduOIIy  rn  the exclus•on 
HlCiuded 1nto the 
Scheme 
list  of all ASEAN 
member states 
excepted 
Included  Included 
-Included  Included 
rv,nerol :uels .  Included 
excepted 
SERVICES 
Telecom  Iransport  I  Financial  I 
Buslnes$ 
A1r  transport-
lnc.tuded  Ol10n serviCeS  Included  1  tnctuded. 
excluded 
Included  included  Included  I  tnciuded. 
. Still being negoc•aled. except for  air  transportat1on services 
where on agreement has already been  reached.  -
Yes. 
especially 
in the use of 
networks 
No.  the ireoty deals  ' 
essen:1a11y  with trade rn go_ods 
Yes.  with sorne  j 
exceptions on  \ 
monetary and  · 
exchange po!:cy l 
· ln,cluded  Included 
E.xcec:eo :nose :nscriOed rn  .. negat1ve hsts" 
No  No  InCluded  Included 
f'.:e(::Ol10I10ns ore Qur:e ·oavonced 
lhev would 1nilru11y  cover telecoms  ana tronsporlol•on 
:1) Rules. potteined on rne TRIPS agreement. ore set up com'mrttrng eacti cour.1tiy to provide effective protectron·ond enforcement of •ntellectuol propertv IIQr'liS  Furthermore  1nst•!utiona1. 
diSpute-settlement. tr'onsporency. acceSSIOn and duroflon prOviSiOns Ore  InCluded  , 
:2) All these sectors ore •ncluded 1n  the Mercosur Treaty  However  !he member states aie still discu-ssing the creation of o cus:orns unton whose field of oct1on wrll not be deftned before January  199.S 
and which coui.j moarfy the FTA  ·  ·  - · 
)) In the agreement s•c;ned  1n  1969.  ,,  was foreseen to create o  tree-trace or eo for  tile year  199a.  Thts  ObJeCtive was nq1  occomol•shed but there hove been several bliotero! ogreemen:s oetwee,-, 
the members (Agreemeni between BOIIVIG cmd Peru and Agreement bel;,..,een Colombia and.Venezuela)  I  . 
:a) Even though there c;re  some.products wrlh o "0" larrH. most_ of them ore strongly protected -
· Source:  DG  I serv1ces 
r-..1 ·,' 
"'""t 